USA v. Singletary by unknown
2001 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
10-2-2001 
USA v. Singletary 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2001 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Singletary" (2001). 2001 Decisions. 225. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2001/225 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2001 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed October 2, 2001 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 00-3850 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JAMAAL ADEEM ATIF SINGLETARY, 
a/k/a 
JAMAL SINGLETARY 
a/k/a 
CURTIS SINGLETARY 
 
       Jamaal Singletary, 
 
       Appellant 
 
ON APPEAL FROM THE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
(D.C. Criminal No. 00-cr-00199) 
District Court Judge: The Honorable Charles R. Weiner 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 27, 2001 
 
Before: ROTH, BARRY, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: October 2, 2001) 
 
 
  
       Maureen Kearney Rowley 
        Chief Federal Defender 
       David L. McColgin 
        Assistant Federal Defender 
       Federal Court Division 
       Defender Association of Philadelphia 
       Suite 540 West - The Curtis Center 
       Independence Square West 
       Philadelphia, PA 19106-2414 
 
        ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
 
       Michael L. Levy 
        United States Attorney 
       Robert A. Zauzmer 
        Assistant United States Attorney 
        Chief of Appeals 
       Lesley S. Bonney 
        Assistant United States Attorney 
       615 Chestnut Street, Suite 1250 
       Philadelphia, PA 19106 
 
        ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 
Following a jury trial, defendant, Jamaal Singletary, was 
convicted on one count of possession of a firearm by a 
convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 922(g)(1). On 
appeal, Singletary contends that the felon-in-possession 
statute is unconstitutional because the conduct it 
proscribes -- the intrastate possession of a firearm -- does 
not have a substantial effect upon interstate commerce, 
and thus does not constitute a valid exercise of Congress' 
authority under the Commerce Clause. Specifically, 
Singletary contends that, although in United States v. 
Gateward, 84 F.3d 670 (3d Cir. 1996), we upheld the 
constitutionality of S 922(g)(1) as a proper exercise of 
Congress' regulatory power under the Commerce Clause, 
that holding must be reconsidered in the wake of the 
Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Morrison, 529 
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U.S. 598 (2000), and Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 
(2000). Because we conclude that those decisions do not 
undermine our prior construction of the felon-in-possession 
statute, we will reaffirm our holding in Gateward and affirm 
the judgment of the District Court. 
 
I. 
 
The relevant facts are not in dispute. During the evening 
of December 8, 1999, Police Officer Thomas Liciardello was 
watching a suspected stolen car in the area of Cobbs Creek 
Parkway and Larchwood Avenue in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania. At about 7:30 p.m., while watching the car, 
Liciardello saw a blue pick-up truck drive across the 
sidewalk and into the park located there. He saw 
Singletary, the driver, get out of the truck, fire two shots 
into the air with a silver handgun, and then jump back into 
the truck and drive on through the park. Liciardello radioed 
information about the truck, and Officers John Spence and 
Maurice Haughton began chasing the truck as it left the 
park. During the chase, Spence saw a gun tossed out the 
passenger side window. The officers stopped the truck a 
short distance later, and Officer Liciardello located the gun 
on the street. 
 
On April 18, 2000, a grand jury in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania indicted Singletary on one count of unlawful 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 
18 U.S.C. S 922(g)(1). Specifically, he was charged with 
having "knowingly possessed in and affecting foreign and 
interstate commerce, a .38 caliber Taurus International 
revolver . . . loaded with four live rounds and two spent 
rounds of ammunition." On July 5, 2000, the District Court 
denied a defense motion to dismiss the indictment, 
rejecting Singletary's argument that the statute is 
constitutionally infirm both facially and as applied because 
it does not require that the act of gun possession have a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce. 
 
At trial, the Government established through the 
undisputed expert testimony of Special Agent James J. 
Uvena of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms that 
the gun in question was manufactured in Brazil, imported 
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into the United States through Atlanta, Georgia, and 
eventually sent to a firearms dealer in Texas in 1973. No 
further documentation on the gun was available, and thus, 
the Government presented no evidence regarding when the 
gun had come into Pennsylvania. Additionally, the 
Government presented no evidence concerning any effect 
the gun had on interstate commerce. As for the other 
elements of the crime, Singletary stipulated that he had a 
prior felony conviction, and the issue of possession, while 
hotly contested at trial, is not germane to the issues before 
us on appeal. 
 
At the close of the Government's case, defense counsel 
submitted a proposed jury instruction that would have 
required the Government to prove "[t]hat the possession of 
the firearm substantially [a]ffected interstate commerce." An 
additional proposed instruction would have given the jury 
the following definition of the phrase "in or affecting 
commerce": 
 
       This means that the government must prove beyond a 
       reasonable doubt that, the possession of the firearm in 
       question, had a substantial effect on interstate 
       commerce. In order to find that the possession of this 
       weapon had the requisite impact on interstate 
       commerce, you must find that the possession of the 
       gun in question had a substantial relation to interstate 
       commerce in and of itself. 
 
The court denied the requested instructions and also 
barred defense counsel from arguing to the jury that the 
Government had failed to prove that the possession of the 
firearm had a substantial relation to interstate commerce. 
For its charge, the court instructed the jury that: 
 
       [t]o prove that the firearm was possessed in or affecting 
       interstate or foreign commerce, the Government must 
       prove that at some time prior to defendant's possession 
       of the firearm, the firearm had traveled in interstate or 
       foreign commerce . . . that at any time prior to the date 
       charged in the Indictment, the firearm crossed a state 
       line. 
 
The jury returned a guilty verdict. Defense counsel once 
again moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the court 
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denied on November 6, 2000. The court subsequently 
sentenced Singletary to 27 months' imprisonment, three 
years' supervised release, a special assessment of $100, 
and a fine of $200. 
 
II. 
 
On appeal, Singletary contends that the Supreme 
Court's recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence renders 
18 U.S.C. S 922(g)(1), the felon-in-possession statute, 
unconstitutional, and therefore, his conviction invalid. In 
the alternative, he argues for a reversal because of 
insufficient evidence on the interstate commerce element, 
or for a new trial because of the District Court's erroneous 
jury instructions on that same element.1  
 
The District Court exercised jurisdiction over this case 
under 18 U.S.C. S 3231, and we have appellate jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Because Singletary challenges the 
constitutionality of S 922(g)(1), we will exercise plenary 
review over the District Court's assertion of federal 
jurisdiction. See United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 469 
(3d Cir. 1999) ("Our review of the statute's constitutionality 
is plenary, though we must respect Congress's ample 
discretion to determine the appropriate exercise of its 
Commerce Clause authority."), cert. denied , 529 U.S. 1131 
(2000); accord United States v. One Toshiba Color Television, 
213 F.3d 147, 151 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) ("Our review 
over constitutional issues is plenary."). Moreover, "[b]ecause 
each of [Singletary's] challenges is based on the district 
court's construction of statutes and case law, we will 
exercise plenary review." United States v. Cross, 128 F.3d 
145, 147 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
A. 
 
Under the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution, Congress is empowered "[t]o regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several 
States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. Const., art. I, S 8, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Singletary moved for an initial en banc  consideration of his appeal by 
this Court, but we denied that request. 
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cl. 3. Pursuant to this authority, Congress enacted the 
felon-in-possession statute, which provides, in relevant 
part: 
 
       (g) It shall be unlawful for any person -- 
 
       (1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime 
       punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one 
       year . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign 
       commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any 
       firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or 
       ammunition which has been shipped or transported in 
       interstate or foreign commerce. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 922(g)(1). The statute can be read to create 
three crimes for convicted felons: (1) "to ship or transport in 
interstate or foreign commerce . . . any firearm or 
ammunition"; (2) "to . . . possess in or affecting commerce, 
any firearm or ammunition"; and (3) "to receive any firearm 
or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in 
interstate or foreign commerce." Plainly, (1) shipping or 
transporting and (3) receiving any firearm or ammunition 
"in interstate or foreign commerce" are both distinct crimes. 
Notably, however, Congress did not use the phrase"in 
interstate or foreign commerce" when it criminalized 
possession. Instead, Congress merely employed the phrase 
"in or affecting commerce." 
 
At the time the Supreme Court established what remains 
the governing jurisprudence on federalization of gun 
possession, the felon-in-possession statute, then codified at 
18 U.S.C. S 1202(a), was phrased differently. Specifically, 
the "predecessor statute to S 922(g)(1)[ ] made any felon 
`who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or 
affecting commerce . . . any firearm' guilty of a federal 
offense." United States v. Gateward, 84 F.3d 670, 671 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (quoting 18 U.S.C. S 1202(a) (repealed 1986)). In 
two key decisions, the Supreme Court addressed the 
interstate commerce aspect of this predecessor statute to 
S 922(g)(1). 
 
First, in United States v. Bass, the Court construed 18 
U.S.C. S 1202(a) against the Government's contention that 
the statute "banned all possessions and receipts of firearms 
by convicted felons, and that no connection with interstate 
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commerce had to be demonstrated in individual cases." 404 
U.S. 336, 338 (1971). In rejecting the Government's 
expansive reading, the Court held that "the commerce 
requirement in S 1202(a) must be read as part of the 
`possesses' and `receives' offenses." Id. at 350. That is, the 
use of commas in the language of the statute implied an 
enumeration of related ideas, all modified by the phrase "in 
commerce or affecting commerce." The Court further opined 
that, "[a]bsent a clearer statement of intention from 
Congress than is present here, we do not interpretS 1202(a) 
to reach the `mere possession' of firearms" because 
otherwise, without "proof of some interstate commerce 
nexus in each case, S 1202(a) dramatically intrudes upon 
traditional state criminal jurisdiction." Id.  
 
Nearly six years later, the Court in Scarborough v. United 
States had the opportunity to address squarely"whether 
proof that the possessed firearm previously traveled in 
interstate commerce is sufficient to satisfy the statutorily 
required nexus between the possession of a firearm by a 
convicted felon and commerce." 431 U.S. 563, 564 (1977). 
The Court accepted the Government's contention that it 
only need prove that "the firearm possessed by the 
convicted felon traveled at some time in interstate 
commerce." Id. at 568. Thus, the Scarborough Court 
established the proposition that the transport of a weapon 
in interstate commerce, however remote in the distant past, 
gives its present intrastate possession a sufficient nexus to 
interstate commerce to fall within the ambit of the statute. 
Because S 1202(a) is the predecessor to the current felon- 
in-possession statute, this statutory construction applies 
equally to S 922(g)(1). 
 
B. 
 
Distilled to its core, we construe the precise question 
raised by Singletary in this appeal to be whether the 
proposition established in Scarborough survives as a viable 
statutory construct in the wake of United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549 (1995), United States v. Morrison , 529 U.S. 
598 (2000), and Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 
(2000). Specifically, Singletary contends that the felon-in- 
possession statute is facially unconstitutional because the 
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conduct it proscribes -- the intrastate possession of a 
firearm -- does not have a substantial affect upon 
interstate commerce, and thus, does not constitute a valid 
exercise of Congress' authority under the Commerce 
Clause. Alternatively, as applied to his circumstances, 
Singletary maintains that the statute is unconstitutional 
because there was no evidence that his possession of the 
gun substantially affected interstate commerce, or indeed, 
that it had any effect whatsoever on commerce, interstate 
or intrastate. Consequently, Singletary argues that the 
District Court erred in failing to give the requested jury 
instructions regarding the Government's burden of proving 
that the possession of the gun substantially affected 
interstate commerce, and in barring defense counsel from 
arguing this point to the jury. 
 
In Lopez, the Supreme Court addressed the 
constitutionality of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 
18 U.S.C. S 922(q)(1)(A), which made it a federal offense "for 
any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place 
that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to 
believe, is a school zone." The Court concluded that 
Congress had exceeded its authority under the Commerce 
Clause in enacting this statute because the statute neither 
regulated a commercial activity (possession of a gun near a 
school) nor contained a requirement that the possession of 
a firearm in a school zone be connected in any way to 
interstate commerce. See 514 U.S. at 551, 567-68. 
 
The Lopez Court initially reviewed the history of its 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, stressing that Article I, 
S 8 of the Constitution gave Congress enumerated (and 
therefore limited) powers, particularly as against the 
antecedent powers of the states, and that an expansive 
construction of the Commerce Clause would effectively read 
out those limitations. See id. at 552-58. Consistent with 
this jurisprudence, the Court identified three broad areas 
that Congress may regulate under the Commerce Clause: 
(1) "the use of the channels of interstate commerce"; (2) "the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons and 
things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may 
only come from intrastate activities"; and (3)"those 
activities having a substantial relation to interstate 
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commerce." Id. at 558-59. In Lopez , the Court determined 
that the plain language of the regulation at issue placed it 
in the third category. See id. at 559. But the Court also 
noted that S 922(q) was "a criminal statute that by its terms 
has nothing to do with `commerce' or any sort of economic 
enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms." 
Id. at 561. 
 
Next, the Court observed that "S 922(q) contains no 
jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case- 
by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question 
affects interstate commerce." Id. On this point, it 
distinguished its prior holding in Bass, noting that there it 
had found the requisite nexus to interstate commerce when 
the criminal statute contained a clause limiting its reach to 
the receipt, possession, or transfer of firearms in commerce. 
See id. at 561-62. As we explained above, Bass involved a 
challenge to the former 18 U.S.C. S 1202(a), the predecessor 
to today's S 922(g)(1). Thus, while the Supreme Court has 
never addressed S 922(g)(1) in its current form, it presumed 
that the former S 1202(a) would survive constitutional 
scrutiny if the Government provided evidence to show that 
the firearm was possessed or transported in commerce. See 
Bass, 404 U.S. at 351. The Court, of course, established in 
Scarborough the proposition that proof of a firearm's prior 
travel in interstate commerce demonstrated a sufficient 
nexus to commerce to justify federal prohibition. Thus, the 
Court in Lopez concluded that, "[u]nlike the statute in 
Bass, S 922(q) has no express jurisdictional element which 
might limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions 
that additionally have an explicit connection with or effect 
on interstate commerce." 514 U.S. at 562. 
 
Finally, the Court examined the legislative history of the 
regulation, observing that the Government itself had 
conceded in its brief that " `[n]either the statute nor its 
legislative history contain[s] express congressional findings 
regarding the effects upon interstate commerce of gun 
possession in a school zone.' " Id. at 562 (quoting Gov't Br. 
at 5-6). In the end, the Court rejected the Government's 
contention "that possession of a firearm in a school zone 
may result in violent crime and that violent crime can be 
expected to affect the functioning of the national economy" 
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because to accept it would require "pil[ing] inference upon 
inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert 
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a 
general police power of the sort retained by the States." Id. 
at 563, 567. 
 
A year after Lopez, we had the occasion to consider its 
implications for the felon-in-possession statute,S 922(g)(1). 
In United States v. Gateward, we stated that we did "not 
understand Lopez to undercut the Bass/Scarborough 
proposition that the jurisdictional element `in or affecting 
commerce' keeps the felon firearm law well inside the 
constitutional fringes of the Commerce Clause." 84 F.3d 
670, 671 (3d Cir. 1996). Rather, we explained as follows: 
 
       The Lopez Court invalidated S 922(q) because "by its 
       terms [it] has nothing to do with `commerce' or any sort 
       of economic enterprise, however broadly one might 
       define those terms," and because "S 922(q) contains no 
       jurisdictional element which would ensure, through 
       case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in 
       question affects interstate commerce." 
 
Id. at 671-72 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561). Thus, the 
Gateward Court, noting that the gun in question"had 
moved in interstate commerce," straightforwardly applied 
Scarborough and affirmed the conviction. Id.  at 672. As 
Singletary correctly points out, however, our respect for the 
uniformity of decisions within this Court yields when a 
prior panel's holding conflicts with a holding of the 
Supreme Court. Mennen Co. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. , 147 F.3d 
287, 294 n.9 (3d Cir. 1998). Thus, the Supreme Court's 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence in criminal cases since 
Lopez necessitates a re-examination of our analysis in 
Gateward. 
 
C. 
 
In United States v. Morrison, the Supreme Court 
invalidated 42 U.S.C. S 13981, a statute that federalized "a 
crime of violence committed because of gender or on the 
basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus 
based on the victim's gender." See 529 U.S. at 607-27. 
Although the Court acknowledged its statement in Lopez 
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that " `we have upheld a wide variety of congressional Acts 
regulating intrastate economic activity where we have 
concluded that the activity substantially affected interstate 
commerce,' " it stressed that "a fair reading of Lopez shows 
that the noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct at 
issue was central to our decision in that case." Id. at 610 
(quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559). The Court further 
explained that "Lopez's review of Commerce Clause case 
law demonstrates that in those cases where we have 
sustained federal regulation of intrastate activity based 
upon the activity's substantial effects on interstate 
commerce, the activity in question has been some sort of 
economic endeavor." Id. at 611; see also id. at 613 
(observing that "thus far in our Nation's history our cases 
have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate 
activity only where that activity is economic in nature"). 
 
Analogizing to the statute at issue in Lopez, the Court 
recognized that "S 13981 contains no jurisdictional element 
establishing that the federal cause of action is in pursuance 
of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce." Id. 
Indeed, the Court noted that "such a jurisdictional element 
would lend support to the argument that S 13981 is 
sufficiently tied to interstate commerce . . . ." Id. 
Consequently, the Court read out the "costs of crime" and 
"economic effects" that Congress had canvassed in the 
extensive legislative history of the statute: 
 
       Given these findings and petitioners' arguments, the 
       concern that we expressed in Lopez that Congress 
       might use the Commerce Clause to completely 
       obliterate the Constitution's distinction between 
       national and local authority seems well founded. The 
       reasoning that petitioners advance seeks to follow the 
       but-for causal chain from the initial occurrence of 
       violent crime (the suppression of which has always 
       been the prime object of the States' police power) to 
       every attenuated effect upon interstate commerce. If 
       accepted, petitioners' reasoning would allow Congress 
       to regulate any crime as long as the nationwide, 
       aggregated impact of that crime has substantial effects 
       on employment, production, transit, or consumption. 
 
Id. at 615 (citation omitted). 
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Hence, after Morrison, the "economic effects" rationale 
and congressional findings regarding such effects alone will 
not serve to save a criminal statute under the Commerce 
Clause if no commercial activity is, in fact, involved. 
Notably, the Morrison Court (while not expressly addressing 
it) implicitly left intact the proposition set forth in 
Scarborough. Namely, to satisfy the statutorily required 
nexus between the possession of a firearm by a convicted 
felon and interstate commerce, the Government need only 
prove that the possessed firearm previously traveled in 
interstate commerce. See id. at 658 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(noting that the Court reaffirmed Congress' power"to enact 
laws that satisfy a commerce-related jurisdictional 
prerequisite -- for example, that some item relevant to the 
federally regulated activity has at some time crossed a state 
line" and citing, among other decisions, Bass  and 
Scarborough). 
 
Seven days after the Supreme Court announced Morrison, 
it rendered its decision in Jones v. United States, 
construing a criminal statute drafted with an explicit 
interstate commerce jurisdictional element. Specifically, 
that statute, 18 U.S.C. S 844(i), makes it a federal crime to 
damage or destroy, "by means of fire or an explosive, any 
. . . property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in 
any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce." Jones 
had "tossed a Molotov cocktail through a window into a 
home in Fort Wayne, Indiana, owned and occupied by his 
cousin." 529 U.S. at 851. He was thereafter indicted and 
convicted of this federal arson charge, and the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed his conviction. 
 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, framing the 
question presented as: 
 
       Whether, in light of United States v. Lopez, and the 
       interpretive rule that constitutionally doubtful 
       constructions should be avoided, 18 U.S.C. S 844(i) 
       applies to the arson of a private residence; and if so, 
       whether its application to the private residence in the 
       present case is constitutional. 
 
Id. at 852 (internal citations omitted). In the Supreme 
Court, the Government argued that the Fort Wayne 
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residence was indeed "used" in at least three activities 
"affecting commerce" because: (1) the house was "collateral 
to obtain and secure a mortgage from an Oklahoma lender"; 
(2) the homeowner insured the residence with "a casualty 
insurance policy from a Wisconsin insurer"; and (3) the 
dwelling received "natural gas from sources outside 
Indiana." Id. at 855. However, the Court (in an opinion 
authored by Justice Ginsburg) rejected these arguments, 
reasoning that, "[w]ere we to adopt the Government's 
expansive interpretation of S 844(i), hardly a building in the 
land would fall outside the federal statute's domain." Id. at 
857. 
 
Importantly for our analysis (and particularly striking 
because Justice Ginsburg was a Lopez dissenter), the Court 
wrote: "Given the concerns brought to the fore in Lopez, it 
is appropriate to avoid the constitutional question that 
would arise were we to read S 844(i) to render the 
`traditionally local criminal conduct' in which petitioner 
Jones engaged `a matter for federal enforcement.' " Id. at 
858 (quoting Bass, 404 U.S. at 350). The language Justice 
Ginsburg quoted came from Bass, and two sentences later, 
she again quoted Bass when she wrote: "We have 
cautioned, as well, that `unless Congress conveys its 
purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly 
changed the federal-state balance' in the prosecution of 
crimes." Id. (quoting Bass, 404 U.S. at 349). Thus, to avoid 
Lopez concerns, as well as to maintain "the federal-state 
balance" as a matter of statutory construction, the Court 
held that the statute "covers only property currently used 
in commerce or in an activity affecting commerce." Id. at 
858, 859. Notably, in so holding (although without explicitly 
stating), the Supreme Court chose not to extend the 
proposition established in Scarborough to home ownership, 
as the Government had invited it to do. That is, the Court 
did not expand Scarborough to mean that a piece of 
property, used in interstate commerce at some time in the 
past, gave its current intrastate use a sufficient nexus to 
interstate commerce to fall within the ambit of the arson 
statute. 
 
Despite the continued vitality of Scarborough , Singletary 
would have us construe S 922(g)(1) without its benefit. That 
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is, he urges that we read the Supreme Court's use in Jones 
of the phrase "currently used in commerce or in an activity 
affecting commerce" as suggesting that the interstate 
quality of a firearm, at some time in the past, has no 
bearing on its present day status for purposes of fulfilling 
the interstate commerce element. According to Singletary, 
such a construction would also avoid Lopez and Morrison 
implications by restricting the scope of the statute to apply 
only to guns and ammunition that are currently in or 
affecting commerce. In short, abandoning Scarborough 
would permit us to conclude that Singletary's possession of 
the gun was neither "used in commerce" nor had any 
present or imminent interstate aspect. Moreover, we would 
be constrained to conclude that the possession of the gun 
did not occur in any commercial or transactional context. 
His conviction therefore could not stand because he 
essentially would have committed no federal crime under 
S 922(g)(1). 
 
Missing from Singletary's analysis, however, is the 
recognition that, while Lopez and Morrison were questions 
concerning the power of Congress to regulate activities 
substantially affecting interstate commerce, S 922(g)(1) 
regulates the possession of goods moved in interstate 
commerce. The jurisdictional element in S 922(g)(1) 
distinguishes it from the statutes considered in Lopez and 
Morrison. Section 922(g)(1), by its very terms, only regulates 
those weapons affecting interstate commerce by being the 
subject of interstate trade. It addresses items sent in 
interstate commerce and the channels of commerce 
themselves, delineating that the latter be kept clear of 
firearms. Thus, an analysis of the kind utilized in Lopez or 
Morrison is neither appropriate nor needed. 
 
Jones provides no further insight for us. While the law 
challenged in Jones did have a jurisdictional element, the 
challenge there involved the alleged use of a residence in 
activities affecting interstate commerce. The rationale used 
by the Jones Court to hold that the federal arson statute 
only encompassed "property currently used in commerce or 
in an activity affecting commerce" has little impact on the 
assessment of whether firearms moved through interstate 
commerce are subject to congressional regulation. The 
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analogy urged by Singletary is made even more 
incongruous because the Jones Court neither expressly 
overruled Scarborough nor rejected its directly applicable 
proposition relevant to interpreting the gun possession 
statutes. 
 
Accordingly, our prior decision in Gateward remains the 
law of this circuit, and we are bound to respect it, absent 
an en banc consideration. See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 9.1; Am. Civil 
Liberties Union of N.J. ex rel. Lander v. Schundler , 168 F.3d 
92, 98 n.6 (3d Cir. 1999). In that vein, as we noted earlier 
in the margin, we denied Singletary's request for an initial 
en banc consideration by this Court. Moreover, even if there 
were merit to Singletary's argument that the Supreme 
Court's trinity of Commerce Clause decisions have 
somehow weakened the precedential value of Scarborough, 
we may not precipitate its decline. The Supreme Court itself 
has admonished lower courts to follow its directly 
applicable precedent, even if that precedent appears 
weakened by pronouncements in its subsequent decisions, 
and to leave to the Court itself " `the prerogative of 
overruling its own decisions.' " Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 
203, 237 (1997) (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 
(1989)). We have always sought to adhere strictly to that 
counsel. See United States v. Abuhouran, 161 F.3d 206, 
215 n.9 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1077 (1999); 
Maldonado v. Houstoun, 157 F.3d 179, 190 (3d Cir. 1998), 
cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1130 (1999); United States v. Bishop, 
66 F.3d 569, 588 n.28 (3d Cir. 1995); Swin Resource Sys., 
Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 255 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
We considered S 922(g)(1)'s post-Lopez constitutionality in 
Gateward and decided in favor of the Government. Morrison 
and Jones give no reason beyond what was already present 
in Lopez to conclude that S 922(g)(1) lies beyond Congress' 
Commerce Clause power. Indeed, our conclusion in 
Gateward was uniformly shared by eight other circuits at 
the time of that decision. See 84 F.3d at 672 (citing cases 
from the Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, 
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits). Our present reaffirmation of 
that holding joins those same eight circuits, all of which 
have readdressed this issue in the wake of Morrison and 
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Jones. See United States v. Dupree, 258 F.3d 1258, 2001 
WL 835847, at *1 & n.1 (11th Cir. July 25, 2001); United 
States v. Stuckey, 255 F.3d 528, 529-30 (8th Cir. 2001); 
United States v. Gallimore, 247 F.3d 134, 137-38 (4th Cir. 
2001); United States v. Davis, 242 F.3d 1162, 1162-63 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (per curiam), petition for cert. filed, No. 00-10772 
(U.S. June 18, 2001); United States v. Santiago , 238 F.3d 
213, 216-17 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam), cert. denied, 121 S. 
Ct. 2016 (2001); United States v. Dorris, 236 F.3d 582, 584- 
86 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1635 (2001); 
United States v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394, 399-402 (6th Cir. 
2000); United States v. Wesela, 223 F.3d 656, 659-60 (7th 
Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1145 (2001). We are 
aware of no appellate court that has decided differently. 
 
III. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the proof in this case that 
the gun had traveled in interstate commerce, at some time 
in the past, was sufficient to satisfy the interstate 
commerce element, and therefore, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court. 
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